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Abstract Having experienced natural disasters, accidents, and economic crises, 
people are getting skeptical about technological approaches to risk management. 
The conventional approaches have not considered sufficiently how to manage 
residual risks that spill out of the design basis of a complex socio-technical sys-
tem. Resilience, which means the ability of a system to absorb changes and distur-
bances in the environment and to maintain system functionality, is a key concept 
for resolving the above situation, and resilience engineering is an area where tech-
nical methodologies to implement resilience into socio-technical systems are stud-
ied. In this chapter, the prehistory of resilience engineering will be described first 
where the focal point of systems safety has gradually shifted from hardware com-
ponent failures to the resilience of complex socio-technical systems. Then some 
relevant topics in resilience engineering will be discussed: how systems resilience 
can be evaluated and implemented, and the key issues to be resolved in the future.
Keywords Resilience engineering · Socio-technical system · Safety management · 
Crisis management · Human reliability
24.1  Introduction
We are surrounded by various kinds of dangers including natural disasters, acci-
dents, medical diseases, economic crises, and crime. Prevention of damage and 
protection of people’s safe living are great missions for engineering. Remarkable 
efforts have been made in conventional safety, reliability, and disaster prevention 
engineering to assess risks qualitatively or quantitatively, prevent manifestation 
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of damage, and suppress damage to the minimum extent. Such efforts contributed 
greatly to making our lives far safer. Risk is a measure for representing the degree 
of danger as a combination of the scale and the probability that damage will occur. 
When there is a possibility that disasters or accidents may cause damage to human 
lives, health, or assets, risk is a very useful measure for achieving safety.
Having experienced unanticipated disasters in this century, however, we have 
recognized that we need a new framework of systems safety that can cover unan-
ticipated situations that spill out of the scope of conventional risk management.
24.2  Shift in the Focal Point of Systems Safety
24.2.1  Era of Technology
Figure 24.1 shows how the focal point of systems safety has changed in the past 
decades. Some events that characterize the changes are also indicated in the figure.
When socio-technical systems were not very complex, specialists thought that 
problems occur for technical reasons, such as failures or malfunctions of hardware 
components, and that they can prevent accidents and disasters by further advances 
in technologies. Efforts were made, therefore, to carry out safety design and qual-
ity assurance based on understanding of failure mechanisms, and most problems 
with hardware components were successfully resolved.
The world’s first commercial jetliner launched in 1951, de Havilland Comet, 
crashed repeatedly due to metal fatigue, which is a phenomenon in which a mate-
rial breaks when great loads are repeatedly applied. The phenomenon itself had been 
known, but the validation testing method was immature at the time. Following the acci-
dents, many technical improvements and redesigns were made, including improvement 
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Similar problems occurred in the early introduction stage of nuclear power. 
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) in the recirculation loop piping of Boiling Water 
Reactors (BWRs) and wall thinning in the steam generator tubes of Pressurized 
Water Reactors (PWRs) were serious problems for the industry from the 1950s to 
1980s. As technical studies revealed the mechanisms of cracking and degradation, 
which had not been understood at the beginning, the problems were resolved by 
substituting the materials with newly designed alloys, improving the management 
of water chemistry, and improving the method of fabrication.
24.2.2  Era of Human Error
As advanced technologies have been introduced, the complexity of systems 
exceeded the capacity limits of human operators or users, and many accidents 
occurred due to human error.
The Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident that occurred in 1979 was a typi-
cal case in this era. The accident started with a minor malfunction in the secondary 
loop, but subsequent unfavorable events made the situation worse, finally leading to 
severe damage of the reactor core. Some of the critical events that caused the acci-
dent include operators’ human errors. The operators, for example, misjudged that the 
reactor vessel was full of coolant water, and they tripped manually the Emergency 
Core Cooling System (ECCS) which had been initiated automatically.
The point where humans interact with human-made equipment is called a 
human-machine interface. Analysis of the TMI-2 accident revealed that there were 
improper human-machine interfaces behind the operators’ errors. At the begin-
ning, for example, more than 100 alarms were initiated at the same time, and the 
operators were unable to comprehend what had actually happened in the plant. In 
addition, the indication of the relief valve position did not reflect the actual valve 
position. This defect in interface design caused a delay in operators’ correctly rec-
ognizing the internal state of the reactor vessel.
Individual human factors and prevention of human errors became key issues in 
this stage [1], and efforts were made to design working conditions and human-
machine interfaces appropriate for physical and cognitive human characteristics. 
Suppression of unimportant alarms based on prioritization of alarms is an example 
of functions that have been adopted in nuclear power plants after the TMI-2 acci-
dent. Since consideration of human factors is nowadays the standard requirement 
in designing socio-technical systems, the probability that human error may cause a 
serious accident has been greatly reduced.
24.2.3  Era of Socio-Technical Interactions
In the next stage, socio-technical interactions were the main sources of sys-
tem failures. Many accidents occurred due to inadequate interactions among 
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technologies, humans, management, organizations, and society. The impact of 
such accidents often goes beyond the boundary of the organization and cause 
widespread damage to society. An accident of this type is called “organizational 
accident [2].”
The accident that occurred at Chernobyl, Unit 4, in 1986 was a typical organi-
zational accident. At the beginning, it was thought that operators’ violation of the 
operation rules for accomplishing a special test at the plant had caused the acci-
dent. As investigation by the international community progressed, it was revealed 
that organizational and social factors characteristic of the Soviet system at the time 
were the root causes of violation. The operators, for example, were not sufficiently 
trained in background knowledge of operation rules, technical communication was 
lacking between different organizations, workers’ will to obey the rules was low in 
comparison with what was needed to accomplish the norm, and so on.
In the same year, the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated after launch and 
killed the entire crew. The direct cause of the accident was failure of O-ring seals of 
a solid rocket booster due to cold weather. It is said, however, organizational factors 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), such as lack of com-
munication and face-saving decision attitudes, were present behind the direct cause.
The notion of safety culture was introduced after these accidents. Safety culture is 
defined as an assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individu-
als which establish that, as an overriding priority, safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance. Researchers and practitioners made efforts to assess 
the level of safety culture of a particular organization and then to enhance it. Though 
remarkable progress has been made, these efforts are still on-going.
24.2.4  Era of Resilience
In this century, we have experienced more shocking events such as the terrorists’ 
attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the Great East Japan 
(Tohoku) Earthquake in Japan. Vulnerability of our socio-technical systems in the 
face of unanticipated situations was clearly shown in these events. In the conven-
tional approaches of engineering, the design basis is determined beforehand based 
on some assumptions of severe conditions, and safety design is performed so that 
the system can fulfill the design basis. An event that exceeds the design basis, 
however, may happen, and its probability is characterized as residual risks. Since 
losses are unavoidable in such a case, we have to consider how quickly socio-tech-
nical systems can recover from the losses.
The conventional approaches have not considered sufficiently how to manage 
residual risks that spill out of the design basis of a complex socio-technical sys-
tem. Having experienced natural disasters, accidents, economic crises, and so on, 
people are getting skeptical about technological approaches to risk management. 
Now we need a new framework for the safety of socio-technical systems to man-
age risks not only within but also beyond the design basis.
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From the above background, the concept of “resilience” has lately attracted 
widespread interest of researchers and practitioners in systems safety [3, 4]. The 
term means the ability of a socio-technical system to adapt to disturbances from 
the environment and maintain its normal function. If we want to face up to unan-
ticipated situations like WTC and Tohoku, we need to establish a new academic 
field, which we can call resilience engineering, to devise resilient socio-technical 
systems that can quickly recover their functions from damaged conditions.
24.3  Progress in Human Reliability Analysis
24.3.1  First-Generation HRA
In this section, we will discuss the human reliability analysis method to describe 
how the primary focus has shifted from a mechanistic view to a systemic view of 
human performance.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method for qualitative or quantitative 
assessment of the probability (frequency) and the effects of unsafe human acts. In 
the nuclear sector, HRA had already been an essential step in Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) before the TMI-2 accident, because the probabilities of human 
errors in plant operations are basic data required for calculating the core damage 
frequency. In the early stage of development, HRA borrowed primary concepts 
from reliability analysis of hardware components; human errors were thought of as 
phenomena similar to hardware component failures. It was assumed, therefore, that 
operators’ tasks can be divided into elementary task units, and the status of each 
task unit can be described by the binary logic of success versus failure. In addition, 
a human was dealt with as a black box without considering the internal cognitive 
mechanism that determines human performance.
Such methods for HRA are often called first-generation HRA. Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [5] is a typical example of first-generation HRA, which 
was developed early for the first comprehensive PRA of Light Water Reactors, WASH-
1400 [6]. In THERP, a human task is modeled using a binary event tree as shown in 
Fig. 24.2, which shows an example task composed of three steps: (1) connecting power 
to the equipment, (2) turning Switch 1 on, and (3) turning Switch 2 on. Each branching 
Fig. 24.2  Example of 






node corresponds to an elementary task unit and the left and right branches, respec-
tively, show success and failure paths of the task. It is assumed that the basic Human 
Error Probability (HEP) of an elementary task unit is primarily determined by the class 
of the task unit and the error mode. Concrete numbers of basic HEPs can be evaluated 
by looking up the database attached to the THERP handbook [5].
One of the drawbacks of first-generation HRA is its restricted power to describe 
situations of human performance. It is therefore applicable only to tasks that are 
well defined as standard operation procedures. Tasks that require complex cogni-
tive processes of judgment are beyond the scope of first-generation HRA. In the 
TMI-2 accident, the operators misjudged the internal state of the reactor vessel 
based on the information obtained from the main control panel and stopped ECCS 
convinced that it was the correct action. Such an error by conviction or an error of 
commission occurs through an error mechanism very different from simple mis-
haps. Internal cognitive mechanisms of a human have to be looked into to deal 
with errors of commission in HRA.
24.3.2  Second-Generation HRA
Towards the end of the 1980s, many researchers of human factors started thinking 
that some breakthrough was required for HRA methods [7]. It is imperative to take 
errors of commission into account, because they may defeat multiple safety barri-
ers and put the system into critical conditions. In addition, people cannot readily 
detect errors of commission by themselves in comparison with errors of omission.
Human modeling is a key technique to consider the cognitive mechanism of 
human performance for calculating HEPs. Rasmussen’s classification of human 
performance into the three levels of skill, rule, and knowledge is the most popu-
lar example of such ideas of human modeling [8]. As research on human mod-
eling and error psychology has progressed, it has become clear that human errors 
are not causes but consequences of unsafe incidents. Based on the outcomes of this 
research, methods for second-generation HRA were developed in the 1990s [9, 10].
Figure 24.3 shows the conceptual framework for human performance and 
human errors that is the basis of second-generation HRA. The context, which is 
Fig. 24.3  Conceptual 
framework of human 
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a set of situational factors and conditions surrounding human performance, is a 
key concept in second-generation HRA. The context consists of various contex-
tual factors that can be classified into personal, environmental, and social factors. 
Personal factors include those related to the characteristics of individual personnel 
such as experience level, skill level, physical and cognitive features, personality 
traits, and so on. Environmental factors are hardware and software attributes of the 
workplace such as tools, ambient conditions, design of human-machine interface, 
available information, and so on. Social factors are attributes of organizational or 
social institutions such as rules, training programs, workgroup composition, com-
munication systems, and so on.
These factors affect the reliability of human performance through the cog-
nitive mechanism of a human. Since the cognitive mechanism does not dif-
fer greatly among individuals, the reliability of human performance does not 
depend on the functioning of the cognitive mechanism but primarily on the 
appropriateness of context. A context where humans inevitably commit errors, 
Error Forcing Context (EFC), should be attended to in particular. EFC is a con-
text in which everybody will commit an error almost certainly; HEP is almost 
equal to the probability of the appearance of EFC. Since an error of commission 
will occur under EFC just like a common mode failure of mechanical compo-
nents, multiple barriers for error prevention can easily be breached. The context 
of human performance has come to be the target of analysis in second-genera-
tion HRA rather than human performance itself. Important contextual factors to 
be analyzed are chosen based on the consideration of cognitive processes that 
will produce the expected human performance. This was a great shift of con-
ceptualization from the mechanistic image of human performance behind first-
generation HRA.
24.3.3  Cognitive Model of Team Performance
The drawbacks of first-generation HRA are attributable to its basic assump-
tion of the decomposition principle that a human task can be decomposed into 
elementary task units. It is equivalent to the assumption in the linear system 
that the whole is the sum of its parts. It will be shown in this subsection that 
this assumption does not apply to team performance. Since teamwork is used 
in most business settings, the reliability of team performance must be assessed 
in PRA, and some model of team performance is required to do so. The sim-
plest approach is to combine multiple models of individual performance and this 
approach was actually taken in the early stage of development. A team, however, 
is a nonlinear system so that team performance is greater than the simple sum of 
individual performance.
The cognitive processes of team performance can be effectively described 
by the concept of mutual beliefs. Tuomela and Miller introduced a notion of 
“We-Intentions” to describe the cognitive mechanism in a cooperating team as 
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follows [11]. When a team composed of two members, A and B, intends to do a 
cooperative task X, the following conditions hold.
(1) A/B intends to do A’s/B’s own part of X. (intention)
(2) A/B believes that B/A will do B’s/A’s part of X. (belief)
(3) A/B believes that B/A believes that A/B will do A’s/B’s own part of X. (belief 
on belief)
Beliefs like (2) and (3) in the above, which can be recursively defined, are called 
mutual beliefs. Such an explanation of the cooperation mechanism using one’s 
own cognitive state and a corresponding structure of recursive beliefs can clarify 
the constitutive meaning of “sharing” intentions by cooperating team members.
Kanno applied the above notion of mutual beliefs not only to team intentions 
but also to cognitive team processes in general and proposed the Mutual Belief 
Model (MBM) to represent the team cooperation mechanism [12]. Figure 24.4 
shows a recursive structure of cognition and corresponding beliefs of a two-mem-
ber team. The recursive structure of mutual beliefs can be theoretically defined ad 
infinitum, but the three layers shown here will be sufficient to describe realistic 
cooperating situations.
One’s own cognition on the state of the external world and oneself is described 
in the first MBM layer. The beliefs on the partner’s cognition are described in the 
second MBM layer, which is a reflected image of the partner’s first layer. The third 
MBM layer is for describing the beliefs on the partner’s beliefs on one’s own cog-
nition. It is one’s self image through the partner. Since the second and the third 
MBM layers are nonexistent in the cognitive model of an individual, a model that 
merely combines individuals will not contain both layers.
Cooperative team performance can be achieved using all of these MBM layers. 
Cognitive entities on each MBM layer are obtained and related by various types 
Verification
A's mind B's mind
1st layer
      A's cognition       B's cognition
2nd layer A' b li f B' b li fs e e s on
   B's cognition
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Fig. 24.4  Mutual Belief Model and interactions
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of interactions within the layer or between different layers. These interactions are 
classified into four types: verbal communication, mental simulation, complement-
ing, and verification.
Verbal communication is a process to transfer some cognitive entity from one 
person to another by explicit utterance. Mental simulation is a process to derive 
new cognitive entities from some others within the same MBM layer by infer-
ence using knowledge and manipulating mental models. Mental simulation is a 
process for interpretation and prediction not only of the state of external world 
but also of the partner’s behavior. In complementing, some cognitive entity will 
be copied from one MBM layer to another within the same person. One adopts 
this scheme, for instance, in an occasion where he/she supposes his/her partner 
believes X because he/she believes X. Such a supposition, however, sometimes 
results in false presumption. Finally, verification is the comparison of cogni-
tive entities between different MBM layers to check consistency among mutual 
beliefs.
The cognitive processes mentioned above are nonlinear effects in terms of a 
combination of individual cognitive processes, and MBM becomes much more 
complex for a team larger than a dyad. Team cooperation by humans is more than 
simple division of labor. Accidents often occur with highly automated systems 
with no hardware failures, because mutual beliefs and cooperating interactions 
are lacking in systems where a linear human-machine combination is assumed. 
Consideration of the nonlinear nature of team performance is necessary also for 
sophisticated human-machine cooperation.
24.3.4  Safety Culture and High Reliability Organization
Safety culture was a new concept in systems safety that was introduced after 
the Chernobyl accident. As already mentioned, many organizational and social 
factors were found behind the direct cause of the accident, the operators’ vio-
lation of the operation rules. This finding led safety specialists to attend to 
safety culture. Safety culture resides at the basis of the three factors shown 
in Fig. 24.3 that form the context of human performance. In order to prevent 
organizational accidents, safety culture has to be implemented and maintained 
by organizations.
A key question is how we can implement safety culture in organizations and 
maintain it. Research on organization science, in particular on high reliabil-
ity organizations, gives us valuable implications to answer this question. A High 
Reliability Organization (HRO) is an organization where accidents and incidents 
are suppressed below the standard level of the related industry sector. The idea 
first came from the pioneering work by a group at the University of California, 
Berkeley [13]. This group examined behavioral patterns of work groups under 
high-risk and stressful conditions such as aircraft carriers, air traffic control, 
and nuclear power plants. From these studies, the characteristics observable 
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in common among various HROs have been revealed, which is represented in 
a word, mindfulness. Mindfulness consists of the following five elementary 
characteristics:
•	 Preoccupation with failure;
•	 Reluctance to simplify interpretations;
•	 Sensitivity to operations;
•	 Commitment to resilience;
•	 Deference to expertise.
Organizations that incorporate the above characteristics can handle unanticipated 
situations skillfully and can recover from emergency rapidly.
Safety culture and HROs first drew attention for solving problems in the era 
of socio-technical interactions: how to establish proper interactions between tech-
nologies, organizations, and society, and how to avoid organizational accidents. 
These concepts, however, are related also to the ability of socio-technical systems 
to cope with unanticipated situations as suggested in the fourth item of the above 
list, and they give us implications for the era of resilience. A High Reliability 
Organization is sometimes characterized as a learning organization, the ability to 
adapt to changes and disturbances by restructuring itself is an essential require-
ment of a resilient system [14].
24.4  What Is Resilience?
24.4.1  Definition of Resilience
The term resilience has been introduced in different domains, and many research-
ers have given it somewhat different definitions. Holling [15] first introduced the 
term in ecology to mean a measure of the persistence of systems and of their abil-
ity to absorb changes and disturbances and still maintain the same relationships 
between populations or state variables.
As for disaster prevention, Bruneau et al. [16] conceptualized seismic resilience 
as the ability of both physical and social systems to withstand earthquake-gener-
ated forces and demands and to cope with earthquake impacts through situation 
assessment, rapid response, and effective recovery strategies. They pointed out 
resilience can be defined in terms of the following 4R properties:
•	 Robustness: strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and other units of 
analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degra-
dation or loss of function;
•	 Redundancy: the extent to which elements, systems, or other units of analysis 
exist that are substitutable, i.e., capable of satisfying functional requirements in 
the event of disruption, degradation, or loss of functionality;
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•	 Resourcefulness: the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, and 
mobilize resources when conditions exist that threaten to disrupt some element, 
system, or other unit of analysis;
•	 Rapidity: the capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner in 
order to contain losses and avoid future disruption.
They further proposed a measure of seismic resilience, a resilience triangle, which 
is shown in Fig. 24.5, where time and system functionality are respectively repre-
sented horizontally and vertically. The system functionality degrades after the cri-
sis, but it recovers gradually to return to its level before the crisis in the long run. 
The recovery will be rapid for a system with a high resilience but slow for that 
with a low resilience. A resilience triangle is the area of degradation in quality of 
infrastructure over time just after an earthquake to recovery.
The above definition of seismic resilience provides useful insights for discus-
sion on systems resilience. The scope, however, is too restricted within crisis man-
agement after disasters. It focuses just on system responses after a critical event 
like an earthquake, but does not cover everyday activities of risk management in 
normal system operations. A more comprehensive view of systems resilience, 
therefore, is desirable.
Another group who adopted the term around 2,000 is researchers of human fac-
tors and cognitive systems engineering [3, 4]. In the early stage of development, 
they applied a behavioristic view of human performance to assess human error 
probabilities, but soon faced barriers. Then the mechanism of human cognition 
was considered to model more precisely the enigma of human performance. In 
the 1990s, however, they came to recognize that it is almost impossible to model 
human performance and to assess human reliability based on a mechanistic view 
of human performance [7].
A complex socio-technical system, which includes humans as system compo-
nents, shows non-linear interactions among different parts of the system. Such 
interactions make it difficult to comprehend the system by the decomposition prin-
ciple, which worked well with mechanical systems in the past. Studies on complex 














systems have made great progress in the last few decades, and new phenomena 
characteristic to complex systems with non-linearity have been revealed, e.g., 
emergence, chaos, fractal, stylized fact, and power law. These works have shown 
that the probability of highly rare events is much greater than predicted from lin-
ear system models and normal distribution. Such an improbable event that exceeds 
people’s imagination is called the Black Swan [17]. Risk management based on 
the assumption of linear systems and the decomposition principle could not fore-
see such rare events, and people in non-technological domains often criticized this 
approach [18].
These findings on complex systems, however, stimulated our investiga-
tions into the safety of complex socio-technical systems. Kastenberg [19], for 
instance, pointed out it is necessary to consider the nonlinear, self-organizing, 
or chaotic nature of complex systems in risk analysis. Researchers of systems 
safety are now looking at resilience engineering as a more comprehensive and 
advanced concept of risk management. This new notion is based on a systemic 
view of accidents that accidents are caused by a nonlinear combination of per-
formance variability of system functions rather than a linear combination of 
component failures.
24.4.2  Essential Characteristics of Resilience
From a systemic view, resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its 
functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can 
sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions. In 
contrast to resilience in disaster prevention, the systemic notion of resilience will 
not distinguish between normal and abnormal system conditions. Resilience engi-
neering is a field that studies technical methodologies to implement resilience into 
socio-technical systems.
While conventional risk management aims at suppressing risks below the 
allowable limit, risk management in resilience engineering aims at enhancing 
the ability of a system to suppress performance variability under changes, distur-
bances, and uncertainties. Resilience, therefore, deals with every system condition: 
stable operations in normal conditions, prevention of accidents in abnormal con-
ditions, minimization of losses after accidents, and fast recovery from damaged 
conditions.
Woods pointed out that the focus is on assessing the organization’s adaptive 
capacity relative to challenges to that capacity and that the following are essential 
characteristics of resilience [20].
•	 Buffering capacity: the size or kinds of disruptions the system can absorb or 
adapt to without a fundamental breakdown in performance or in the system’s 
structure;
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•	 Flexibility: the system’s ability to restructure itself in response to external 
changes or pressures;
•	 Margin: how closely or how precarious the system is currently operating rela-
tive to one or another kind of performance boundary;
•	 Tolerance: how a system behaves near a boundary, whether the system grace-
fully degrades as stress/pressure increase, or collapses quickly when pressure 
exceeds adaptive capacity.
Figure 24.6 illustrates the above four characteristics of resilience. The current state 
of the system in operation is represented as a point in the two-dimensional state 
space here, and it fluctuates continuously due to performance variability. Safety 
boundaries that correspond to the constraints for safe system operations determine 
the area where the system can be operated.
Margin is a distance between the current operating point and the nearest bound-
ary. Sufficient margin must be maintained so that the probability that the system 
may run out of the safe area will not exceed the design basis. It is the conventional 
approach to risk management.
In contrast, the other three properties are relatively new in risk management. 
Buffering capacity is the ability of a system to absorb or resist changes or distur-
bances. The resilience triangle mentioned in the previous section can be a measure 
of buffering capacity, which is represented as the speed of recovery from dam-
age. Tolerance represents how gracefully system functionality degrades outside 
the safety boundaries. In a system with no tolerance the functionality drops imme-
diately outside the boundaries. Flexibility is related to the ability of a system to 
adapt to changes and disturbances by restructuring itself, redesigning, maintaining, 
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Fig. 24.6  Essential characteristics of resilience
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24.5  Social Aspect of Resilience
Assessment of resilience, preferably quantitative assessment, must be the first 
step to resilience engineering. Since resilience concerns various aspects of system 
response to changes, there can be multiple measures. The resilience triangle is use-
ful but it cannot be the only measure of resilience.
In addition, we should recognize that resilience is different for different stake-
holders. The functionality people  expect with a socio-technical system is differ-
ent for different people, because different people have different interests, sense of 
values, needs, and so on. In discussing resilience engineering of socio-technical 
systems, some framework and methodology for resilience assessment that can 
consider such differences is highly necessary.
Figure 24.7 demonstrates this issue for recovery of infrastructures after the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. Resilience triangles are drawn here for different 
stakeholders and for different levels of needs. These results were obtained from 
the records of activities actually engaged in after the disaster.
Maslow [21] proposed a five-layered hierarchy of human needs, and the levels 
assessed in this example correspond to the basic three layers in Maslow’s hierarchy: 
physiological, safety, and social needs. Figure 24.7 shows the resilience triangles 
for physiological and social needs. Physiological needs, which include air, water, 
food, clothing, and shelter, are the most fundamental needs for survival and they are 
located at the bottom of the hierarchy. Safety needs are located above physiological 
needs. They are related to individual safety and freedom from fear, which include 
personal security, financial security, health, protection against hazards and threats, 
etc. Social needs, which are located next above safety needs, are desires to be liked 
by others, to have interpersonal relationships, to belong to community, etc.
The assessment measure of each needs level was divided into more elementary 
measures until basic data on availability of separate infrastructure services were 
reached (Table 24.1). The basic data on the recovery rate of infrastructures after 
the earthquake were collected primarily from Internet web pages.
To consider different stakeholders, the persona method was used. The per-
sona method is an attempt proposed by Cooper [22] in 1980s for reflecting dif-
ferent user needs and characteristics in product design. A persona is an imaginary 
Fig. 24.7  Resilience triangle of utilities after the Great East Japan Earthquake
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but very specific user model that should be considered in designing products or 
services. In the persona method, many personas can cover the whole scope of 
expected users. Three personas of residents in the same town, Kesennuma, but 
of different features were created and used in this trial referring to opened notes 
of victims. Persona A is a male employee in his 20s, Persona B is a self-employed 
businessman in his 40s, and Persona C is a retired male in his 70s. Needs for dif-
ferent infrastructure services were then evaluated for each persona to assess the 
satisfaction level of physiological, safety, and social needs.
As shown in Fig. 24.7, difference in needs level and stakeholders affect the result 
of resilience assessment considerably. As for physiological needs, for instance, sat-
isfaction dropped greatly and its recovery delayed for Persona C, because his health 
condition was poor and healthcare service was relatively critical. As for social needs, 
recovery of satisfaction was delayed greatly for Persona B, because he could not 
restart his self-owned business and lost financial independence.
It is a difficult task to establish assessment measures and methods that can cover var-
ious aspects of resilience as discussed in the previous section. In addition, however, it is 
also necessary to consider human perception and human recognition in assessment of 
resilience as demonstrated in this trial. Otherwise, outcomes of resilience engineering 
will not match our real needs, and the interests of vulnerable people will be ignored.
24.6  Key Issues in Resilience Engineering
24.6.1  Implementation Process of Resilience
The common characteristics of HROs give us a hint as to how we can incorporate 
resilience into socio-technical systems. In order to prevent resonance of function 
Table 24.1  Decomposition 
of assessment measure
Needs level Item Basic data
Physiological Water Water supply, water 
wagons
Food Shops, distribution
Dwelling Home, evacuation centers
Medical care Hospitals
… …
Safety Electricity Electricity grid, generators
Water Water supply
Gas Gas lines
Information Internet, TV, radio
… …
Social Privacy Home or evacuation center
Job Workplace, employer




variability, the organizations have to repeat the process of four activities: anticipa-
tion, monitoring, response, and adaptation. In anticipation, the organization antici-
pates short-term and long-term threats and changes and gets ready for these threats 
and changes. In monitoring, the organization monitors operation conditions of the 
system to detect precursors of unfavorable performance variability that may cause 
resonance. The organization then takes actions to suppress performance variability 
so that the system will not go beyond its safety boundaries. Finally, the organiza-
tion learns from past experience and restructures itself to adapt so that the system 
can absorb long-term changes.
Most of the base technologies for each step of the above process have already 
been developed in conventional domains, while more advanced technologies are 
also expected in the future. Based on these fundamental technologies, the method-
ologies for synthesizing them, assessing systems resilience, and social installation 
of the outcomes of research should be pursued. The key issues to be resolved in 
resilience engineering are as follows.
24.6.2  Assessment of Resilience
Though the resilience triangle shown in Fig. 24.5 is a simple but promising meas-
ure for quantitatively assessing systems resilience, the measure for representing 
system functionality has some arbitrariness. It is also argued that the cost of sys-
tem recovery should be considered in the resilience measure [23]. The more cost 
is required, the less resilient the system becomes even if the area of resilience tri-
angle is the same. In addition, the essential characteristics of resilience discussed 
in Sect. 24.5 should be reflected in the resilience measure. Among these character-
istics, safety margin can be represented with risk measures that have been used in 
the conventional risk management, but the metrics for the other three characteris-
tics have to be established in the future study.
Consideration of different stakeholders as discussed in the previous section 
is another issue in assessment of resilience. Which function of socio-technical 
systems is important depends on the situation where a particular stakeholder is 
placed. As shown in the case of the previous section, the needs for medical ser-
vices are different between elderly people suffering some health problems and 
healthy young people. Socially vulnerable groups sometimes have to be taken into 
account in assessment of resilience rather than considering the average image of 
the public.
24.6.3  Interdependencies Between Systems
Our society is a complex system of systems that is composed of many systems 
linked together; it is impossible to understand the behavior of the total system if 
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we look at systems separately. Critical infrastructures, for instance, including the 
electric power system, the water supply system, the transportation system, and the 
telecommunication system, are interrelated to each other, and one system depends 
on the others. The telecommunication system, for instance, does not work without 
electric power supply, and the electric power system is controlled using the tele-
communication system. The breakdown of one system, therefore, sometimes leads 
to the breakdown of other systems.
A complex system spreads in a physical space and disturbance in one location 
sometimes propagates to another. It may cause the breakdown of the system over 
a wide area. The disturbance may propagate further to another system through the 
interdependencies among different systems. There is a fear that such cascading 
failures of critical infrastructures might result in serious damage to society.
In order to prevent such cascading failures in case of a devastating natural dis-
aster, terrorist attack, or a crisis of the world market, it is necessary to understand 
system behavior including the interdependencies and take remedial actions to 
eliminate vulnerabilities in the system. In order to enhance the resilience of a sys-
tem of systems, recovery plans must consider the interdependencies among differ-
ent systems. Technologies allowing for a large-scale simulation are expected to be 
developed to consider the interdependencies of a system of systems.
24.6.4  Decision Support
In case of a crisis such that the function of a socio-technical system has been 
severely damaged, some mechanism is highly necessary to collect information 
on the location, type, and scale of damage, victims’ requirements, distribution of 
resources available for system recovery, and to deliver the information to deci-
sion makers. Since fixed sensor-telecommunication networks will be damaged 
by the disaster, mobile systems that can be deployed over the affected area will 
be needed. Airborne or satellite sensing systems are often very useful for crisis 
management.
Collected information has to be delivered in a timely manner to decision mak-
ers. The critical information required by the decision makers must be selected 
from a vast amount of collected information, processed, and presented in a com-
prehensible manner; technologies such as image processing, data mining, infor-
mation retrieval, and visualization will be effective for this purpose. While some 
official information and telecommunication systems were not functioning shortly 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake, some Social Network Services (SNSs) were 
very usable. In addition to centralized and specialized information systems, there-
fore, distributed and general-purpose systems should be focused on.
It should be kept in mind that those who ultimately make decisions are humans. 
Information is not usable for decision-making, if it does not match the cognitive 
characteristics or capabilities of a human. Consideration of human factors is still 
important in designing crisis management systems. In addition, since a group or an 
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organization rather than an individual makes decisions in an emergency, communi-
cation, team collaboration, and organizational factors have to be considered.
Decision support is required not only to recognize emergency situations but 
also for recovery planning in real time, considering interdependencies among dif-
ferent systems. For this purpose, technologies such as disaster simulation, recov-
ery plan optimization, and decision support systems should be developed.
24.6.5  Resilience in Ordinary Situations
Discussions so far have focused primarily on an emergency situation, but resil-
ience is also relevant to safety, reliability, and security of socio-technical systems 
in ordinary situations. Resilience includes abilities of a system to keep its func-
tionality by maintenance, to renovate itself in response to environmental changes, 
and to improve itself by learning lessons from past experience. While resilience 
in an emergency corresponds to recovery from a rapid breakdown of system func-
tion, resilience in an ordinary situation corresponds to recovery from a slow degra-
dation of system function.
Maximum efforts are made to detect and eliminate latent flaws in a system in 
the conventional approach to risk management. It is, however, impossible to oper-
ate a complex socio-technical system with no flaws, thus we are forced to accept 
some latent flaws. Resilience engineering takes the position that function vari-
ability in a system is inevitable but that resonance and propagation of function 
variability have to be damped down to avoid accidents. Flexible response to envi-
ronmental changes is a key to realizing resilient systems.
Minor incidents will occur frequently in every socio-technical system, but 
the trends of minor incidents will change following environmental changes. 
Organizational activities of collecting, analyzing information of such incidents, 
and renovating the facility, organization, or operations referring to the outcomes 
of analysis are essential for avoidance of large-scale accidents. Such activities are 
thought of as organizational learning or system evolution in a larger scale than the 
conventional activities of accident and incident analysis.
24.6.6  Social Installation
In order to install the outcomes of resilience engineering into society, redesign of 
social institutions and organizational operations will be necessary. How to moti-
vate people to adopt the outcomes is a key issue here. Side effects, such as people 
responding to new technologies or new social institutions in an unanticipated manner 
that cause unfavorable consequences, have to be avoided. Studies on social simula-
tion, organizational management, and project management, will contribute to design-
ing social institutions and organizational operations considering such side effects.
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Finally, new technologies must be accepted with consensus among people. 
When specialists claim that technologies contribute to realizing a better society, 
they will be asked questions on what are the criteria of social goodness and for 
whom it will be a better society. These questions should not be answered only by 
specialist as consensus must be developed among interested people.
24.7  Conclusion
The focal point of systems safety has shifted from technologies to human errors, 
socio-technical interactions, and now resilience as the scale and complexity of 
socio-technical systems have increased. Prevention of disasters is the main goal of 
the conventional approach to risk management, and it is achieved in terms of the 
design basis that is determined based on certain assumptions. If the reality exceeds 
these assumptions, losses will occur. Having experienced several disasters, how-
ever, like the terrorist attack on WTC and the Great East Japan Earthquake, peo-
ple have recognized that society has to be ready also for unanticipated situations. 
Resilience, which is the ability of a socio-technical system to absorb effects of dis-
turbances, maintain its normal function, and recover from damage, is a new fron-
tier in systems safety proposed for answering this issue.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
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